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Aristotelian Metaphysics: Essence and Ground
Riin Sirkela , Tuomas Tahkob
aDepartment of Philosophy, University of Vermont
bDepartment of Philosophy, University of Helsinki
is special issue of Studia Philosophica Estonica centers aroundAristotelian
metaphysics, construed broadly to cover both scholarly research on Aristo-
tle’s metaphysics as well as work by contemporary metaphysicians on Aris-
totelian themes. Aristotelian metaphysics is a growing tradition. ere are
increasingly more metaphysicians identifying themselves as ‘Aristotelians’,
and there are more scholars looking at work in contemporary metaphysics
to advance scholarship. Indeed, there have already been a number of vol-
umes showcasing this ‘Aristotelian turn’, including Daniel D. Novotný’s and
LukášNovák’sAristotelian Perspectives inMetaphysics (2014), Edward Feser’s
Aristotle onMethod andMetaphysics (2013), and Tuomas Tahko’s Contempo-
rary Aristotelian Metaphysics (2012).
e contribution this special issue makes to the ongoing discussion is
twofold. First, the special issue promotes a deeper interaction between schol-
ars of Aristotle and contemporary metaphysicians. We hope that the pa-
pers encourage people working in the history of philosophy to relate to con-
temporary discussions and people working in contemporary metaphysics
to engage with Aristotle and Ancient scholarship. Second, the special issue
is unied in its focus on two themes in Aristotelian metaphysics, essence
and grounding. e papers address questions concerning fundamentality
and dependence, ontological independence or priority, the causal priority
of forms, the unity of grounding, the reduction of grounding to essence, the
unity of essence, the roles of essence, and explanation and denition. We
hope that this issue opens up fresh and exciting avenues for future research
both in Ancient scholarship as well as in contemporarymetaphysics. A brief
summary of the volume’s papers follows.
Justin Zylstra takes his cue fromAristotle’s claim in Categories 5 that any
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items alike in nature do not dier in respect to fundamentality, and he uses it
to explore connections between relative fundamentality and dependence. In
neo-Aristotelian discussions these two notions are oen taken to be synony-
mous, but Zylstra shows that dependence is neither necessary nor sucient
for relative fundamentality. He develops an account of relative fundamen-
tality in terms of likeness in nature, and applies his account to some contro-
versial questions that arise in Aristotle’s Categories.
Margaret Cameron draws on Aristotle’s notion of homonymy to pro-
pose a solution to the problem of the unity of grounding. While propo-
nents of grounding take it to be a unied phenomenon, some recent crit-
icisms take issue with this assumption, arguing that there is heterogeneity
to the notion of grounding that makes it useless for performing the ne-
grained work its proponents want it to do. Cameron shows there is a third
option between characterizing grounding as either a unied phenomenon or
merely as equivocal (i.e. same in name only): grounding is an Aristotelian
homonym, and, more specically, a core-dependent, systematic homonym.
Her account accommodates the ideas driving both unity and heterogene-
ity and is compatible with the Aristotelian-orientation of philosophers who
make use of the notion of grounding.
Pablo Carnino tackles a topic which is receiving increasing attention in
the literature on grounding, namely, the analysis of grounding in terms of
essence. Carnino evaluates Fabrice Correia’s attempt to reduce grounding
to essence and argues that Correia has underestimated one objection to this
analysis, originally suggested by Kit Fine. Carnino improves on Fine’s ob-
jection and shows that it can still be considered an obstacle to the analysis
of ground in terms of essence. Moreover, Carnino develops two novel ob-
jections to the analysis although he considers only one of them to be truly
challenging. e upshot of Carnino’s paper is that the operationalist deni-
tion of grounding, as defended, for instance, by Kit Fine, stands its ground.
Ryan Christiansen continues on the topic of essence, arguing that there
are (at least) three dierent notions of essence, each of which is irreducible to
the others. ese notions of essence are essence as constancy amid change,
essence as explanation, and essence as necessity. First, Christensen com-
ments on the debate between the neo-Aristotelian proponents of ‘real essence’
and the Kripke-Putnam inuenced view of essential properties of a thing
as the properties that the thing cannot exist without. ese correspond to
essence as explanation and essence as necessity. He argues that the debate
between these two schools is not substantial because they use the notion of
essence in dierent ways. Christensen then goes on to discuss each of the
notions of essence in more detail and identies several dierent questions
related to these notions. He concludes that each of these notions of essence
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has its important job, but no one notion can do all the work associated with
essence.
Lucas Angioni examines questions concerning essence, necessity and
explanation in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. In particular, he wants to know
what Aristotle means when he says that demonstrations must proceed from
necessary principles. Angioni challenges the interpretation that collapses a
necessary character of a principle into its necessary truth as a sentence and
argues that being a necessarily true sentence is not sucient for being a nec-
essary principle. In his interpretation, a necessary principle is necessary for
attaining the fully appropriate explanation of a given explanandum, and the
most appropriate explanatory factor is what makes the explanandum what
it is. is account of necessary principles helps in understanding Aristotle’s
thesis that demonstrations depend on essences and supports the idea that
necessary properties are grounded in essential properties.
Kathrin Koslicki’s focus is on the central books of Metaphysics and on
Aristotle’s thesis of the form’s priority over matter and matter-form com-
pound. She starts with Aristotle’s claim in Metaphysics Z.17 that form is the
primary cause and principle of a matter-form compound’s being what it is,
and she examines Aristotle’s motivation for locating the primary causal re-
sponsibility for a compound’s being what it is with the form rather than the
matter. Koslicki uses Aristotle’s account of the threefold priority of the ac-
tual over the potential inMetaphysicsΘ.8 to clarify the priority of form over
matter. She develops an explicitly causal account of the form’s priority, argu-
ing that the priority of form over matter in denition, time, and substance is
best explained by appeal to the role of form as the formal, ecient, and nal
cause of the matter-form compound respectively.
Michail Peramatzis’ focus is also on the central books ofMetaphysics, but
he is concernedwith questions regarding sameness and denition. His start-
ing point is the apparent inconsistency between Aristotle’s claims in Meta-
physics Z and H. Aristotle claims that the essence or form is the same as its
essence (e.g. being a human = being a rational soul) and that the essence is
dened in terms of its essence (being a human =de f being a rational soul).
On the other hand, Aristotle claims that the substance-kind is not the same
as its essence (human ≠ being a human), and yet the substance-kind is de-
ned in terms of its essence (human =de f being a human), which would
imply that the substance-kind is the same as its essence. Peramatzis consid-
ers dierent strategies to overcome this inconsistency, which all prove to be
problematic. He locates the problemwithin their shared assumption that the
relevant notion of sameness is that of strict numerical identity, and develops
an account of essential sameness and denition.
Christie omas broadens the discussion by considering Plato’s views
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on metaphysical explanation. She begins with Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s
participation relation, focusing on the charge that participation could not
serve as a genuinely explanatory relation. In response, omas develops an
account of participation and metaphysical explanation by identifying dif-
ferent states of the development of Plato’s ontology. She argues that in his
later dialogues Plato distinguishes between two types of metaphysical pred-
ication, and she follows Pelletier and Zalta in characterizing the distinction
as that between encoding and exemplication. She shows that such an ac-
count of predication renders unfounded Aristotle’s charge that participation
is mere metaphor and empty talk.
Travis Dumsday’s paper concludes the volume. Dumsday focuses on a
somewhat neglected problem concerning essence, sometimes known as the
problem of unity. is problem relates to natural kind essences in particular.
eproblemof unity concerns the relatedness of certain essential properties,
such as themass and charge of a particular electron. ese properties are in-
herently separable, but they are also intimately connected in the essence of
the electron. Dumsday asks: What explains this connection? Dumsday ex-
amines various approaches to this problem but proposes that the late E.J.
Lowe has perhaps made the most progress with regard to it based on Lowe’s
four-category ontology. Dumsday examines Lowe’s solution and identies a
possible problem in it, but he suggests a rejoinder as well. Ultimately, Dums-
day proposes that it may be possible to revise Lowe’s theory in such a way
that a promising line of research regarding the problem of unity can be de-
veloped.
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